A Personal Look at The Life of Dr Charles Cogan

Dr. Charles Cogan. Home | Books | Biography |. Introduction. I am an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA)
Introduction I am an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at the Kennedy School, Harvard University, where I concentrate on European issues and in particular on French-American relations. In 2001, I was asked by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which is a publicly-financed think tank in Washington, to do a book on France in the Institute’s Cross Cultural Negotiations Project, which examines the anner in which other countries negotiate. My book became the sixth in series,after China, Russia, Germany, etc. The book is not so much on the nuts and bolts of egotiations, as it is on the cultural and historical strands satellite phone which together form the tissue of French diplomacy and negotiations. Though I am aware of the dangers of generalization, I contend that there is a French model that is unique and identifiable. The title of my book is French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with ‘la Grande Nation’ (USIP Press, 2003). Note: to order this book, go to the “Links” button on this site and click on the URL for the US Institute of Peace Press. The French-language version of the book, with an update, is entitled Diplomatie à la Française (Editions Jacob-Duvernet, 2005), with isri a preface by former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine.  Due to Diplomatie à la française, I have been awarded the medal of the Prix Ernest Lémonon of the Académie des Sciences Morales at Politiques (ASMP).  Note: to order this book, go to the “Links” button on this site and click on the link to the book in the URL for Amazon.fr diplomatie. jpgMy overall purpose in setting up this website is to make better known my book on French egotiating behavior (in both its English and French versions) and to make available in ext version some of the articles I have written since coming to Harvard in 1989. A complete list of my books and articles from this period is available on my c.v. in this ebsite (See “Bio”), and most of the more recent articles are available in text version should they be required. In addition, there are also in the website unpublished writings (See “Aphorisms,” “Poems,” and “Opinions.”).I initially came to Harvard as a Research Fellow in the Intelligence and Policy Project, a joint (and unclassified) activity of the CIA and the Kennedy School. In 1991, I left the CIA and in 1992 was awarded the degree of Doctor of Public Administration at Harvard. My doctoral thesis became my first book (Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: the United States and France Since 1940). It was followed by six others, as well as by many articles and reviews.In my 37-year career in the CIAin , I spent 23 of them overseas, in generally long tours, respectively in India, Congo, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and France. From 1979-1984, I was chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the Directorate of Operations, and from 1984-1989, I was CIA chief in Paris.On 2 May 2007, I was awarded the grade of Officer in the French Order of the Légion d’honneur and it was presented in Cambridge, MA, on 10 September 2007 by the French Consul General.NTERVIEW WITH DR CHARLES COGAN – AUGUST 1997 INTERVIEWER: From a sort of global and regional sense why was Afghanistan important to US interests during the 80s and late 70s? DR CHARLES COGAN: Well Afghanistan had always been a source of rivalry between the US and the USSR going back to the 50s they built one portion of the road that was the delta way as we called it around Afghanistan and the Russians built the other. We built one part and the Russians built the other part, so there had been a sort of competition for Aid, strange as it may seem, you know 40 or 50 years later we were going head to head on aid programs dating from the 50s. So Afghanistan was a, one of the stakes in the cold war.INTERVIEWER: And what did you feel about Soviet influence in Afghanistan in the years eading up to the invasion? DR CHARLES COGAN: Well the communist party was always strong in Afghanistan and the “Adoud” coup which took place in 1973  sort of cast a different flavor over the monarchy, although “Dhoud” was a relative of the king. nevertheless he was in a way he was like “Zoffri Kar Ali Bhutto” in Pakistan. He brought in a sort of a leftist tint to the regime and that was starting in 73.INTERVIEWER: But how did you, I mean how did you feel about that sort of Soviet, that communist influence? How did the  US feel about that influence? DR CHARLES COGAN: the isatphone pro satellite phone is one of the better Well there was satellite phone the coup in I think it was March of 78, and then it was immediately followed by this assassination of the ambassador by Spike Dubbs, by some militants and the Afghan security forces were very unhelpful and they satellite phone were encountered by Russians we iridium 9555 phone know so I think from that point onward, I’m not exactly sure of the date but there was a great deal of suspicon on the part of Washington toward this communist regime in Kabul and it is interesting iridium 9555 to note that before the Soviet invasion in December 79, there was already a covert action operation in place in Afghanistan in a very rudimentary way against the government and in favor of those who are opposed to the government and this started in the summer of 79.INTERVIEWER: Could you explain a bit more about satellite phone that? DR CHARLES COGAN : Well yes in perhaps you know this in theCIA whenever you engage in an action overseas you have to have presidential authorization. Now this has sometimes been forgotten in the breach as in Iran Contra, but nevertheless this is a rule that’s been in effect since the 1970s approximately. So therefore in the case of this assistance to the rebels in Afghanistan starting in the summer of 79 there had to be what was called a presidential finding  and that is the president signs that he finds this action operation, this covert operation, as in the security interests of the US. So the first finding preceded the Soviet invasion. But it was not for lethal weapons, it was for various kinds of assistance, communications  equipment and so forth, and propaganda assistance.INTERVIEWER: I was just thinking sort of from in a regional sense I mean what did you think the Soviets plans were before the invasion, I mean what did you think the Soviet intentions were in Afghanistan?DR CHARLES COGAN :  We were never sure what they were, even during the war, it seemed that the Soviets had a broader geopolitical ambitions because they did have a considerable build up of the space and Shindan in Southwest Afghanistan. Of course the Pakistanis particularly Zia were convinced that the Soviets had their eyes on Balujastan and on down into the Indian Ocean. We were never sure of this but we couldn’t tell.  there was another moment in the late 70s early 80s when the Russians did a command post exercise indicating the possibility that they might move into ran and into the Gulf. So there was an uncertainty about, a suspicion about Soviet geo-political intentions in the area. Dating from I’d say the late 70s.INTERVIEWER:But how, I’m trying to get an idea of how it figured in the grand scheme for the US Afghanistan and e Soviet influence in it. I mean how, how worried were they?DR CHARLES COGAN: Well to situate this in a more political context, the US had always had a elationship with Pakistan going back to the 50s with the two bases in Pershawa. And it developed from that, that the CIA which is a little bit unusual had a relationship with a military intelligence organization in Pakistan dating from the 50s and despite the many political ups and downs in between the US and Pakistan and their political relations, this liaison relationship between the interservices intelligence directorate which is Pakistani militaryintelligence and the CIA remained.  So when the troubles began in Afghanistan and the Paks of course were very interested in it, it was a marriage of I won’t say convenience but it was a convenient marriage that could  take place between the Paks services and our service to do something vis a vis the Russians in Afghanistan. And I, I just to add a bit to that, we ad come out of Vietnam war with a great deal of disarray in the US and it seemed at the time in the late 70s that the Soviets  were pushing us everywhere. Angola, Horn of Africa and now Afghanistan and this was an opportunity to turn the tables  INTERVIEWER: How do you read Soviet involvement in events such as the April revolution in 78 and the rise of “Amin”? DR CHARLES COGAN : My impression is that the Soviets did not sponsor this 78 revolution, what is called the Saur revolution.  But they probably knew that something was in the  offing, they probably knew about it. Curiously they fell out with Amin over his own independence which was quite pronounced and also over a misunderstanding in his background. Because like many third world figures he had had some connection with the Asia foundation which was sponsored in part by the Agency, and this roused Russian suspicions in a quite unfounded manner. nd then when he came back, when Teraqi came back and having come from Moscow and Amin immediately moved against him, I think this was a signal for the Soviets that Amin had gone too far. But he wasn’t necessarily opposed to the Soviets, he was a sort of national communist. And they were quite misled in thinking that he was an American agent which he wasn’t at all.INTERVIEWER  : I mean how significant was the death of Ambassador  Dubbs do you think?DR CHARLES COGAN : I think it was very significant in that this was not the first time hat it had happened we had the incident in Khartoum  in the early 70s but it sort of like when a policeman is shot, the police force gets very exercised and goes after the problem and I think that this is what happened in the US government, this was an unprovoked attack, an ambassador is killed and this soured the relation between whatever relation there might have been between the Afghan communist government and the US.INTERVIEWER: I mean who do you really feel was to blame for tattoo removal the death of Dubbs? DR CHARLES COGAN: Well I think to a certain extent the Afghan government nd the Soviets themselves were to blame for not taking swift action.INTERVIEWER: You don’t think in any way that the whole thing was masterminded by the KGB or anything? DR HARLES COGAN : I don’t rule it out , but I don’t think so. I don’t think it happened in such an open and shut manner.INTERVIEWER: I mean do you think that events in Iran with the fall of the Shah altered the sort of strategic importance of Afghanistan in the eyes ofthe US?DR CHARLES COGAN : The question of the fall of the Shah I think certainly peaked US nterest in Afghanistan. This was a long simmering crisis. It really began when the Shah’s llness became apparent, not to us but to the French, very early on 72. And I think we finally became aware of the gravity of it in 76 and we were unaware of the weakness executive rental in Fremantle of the onarchy and therefore thought that perhaps the monarchy could whether it. And it didn’t turn out to be the case and it was a considerable setback, we didn’t know what the Soviet osition was in the immediate aftermath of the Khomeini revolution because at that time, leftist organizations such as the Mujaheddin “Carq” were still very strong in the revolution. It hadn’t been purged yet, so the potential Soviet threat toIran seemed to be a strong possibility. And then of course coming on the heels of the Khomeini take-over there was the attack on the Mecca mosque and the riots in Islamabad and we didn’t necessarily put that to the Soviets account no but there was a sense that the US was being threatened throughout the area, whether by Islamists or by the Soviets. And then although there had been a rudimentary operation against the Soviets in Afghanistan since the middle of 79 the invasion, this transparent invasion in December 79 was as they say in the US a “wake up call”. And especially a wake up call for President Carter.INTERVIEWER: I mean how id the loss of listening bases affect the US? Listening bases in ran?DR CHARLES COGAN : Can I cut it here, I’d like to think about this for a second as to how o handle this.INTERVIEWER: I mean for me it’s how events in Iran affect US interests in Afghanistan, does it alter your view of Afghanistan does it make it any more important? Does it make your relationship with Pakistan more  important? CUT:INTERVIEWER: Chat about the affects of Afghan on his digestive system!INTERVIEWER: How did the loss of the intelligence listening bases affect the US?DR CHARLES COGAN : Well I think in a general sense the US had to turn towards Pakistan and shore up the relationship with the Paks which had as I mentioned before many ups and downs since the 50s. The actual listening bases which we had considerable trouble dismantling in Iran because of the revolution sort of overtook the situation, caused us to shift our attention towards Pakistan and then the threat to Pakistan seemed to be very paramount because here was a Soviet, a pro Soviet regime that ad come into power in Afghanistan, India which had increased its strength vis a vis Pakistan continually since the early since 65 was a threat, and Pakistan seemed to be themost apt ally for the US in the area, and so we intensified this relationship. And to do anything in Afghanistan you pass either through Iran which had become out of the question with the Khomeini revolution, or the Soviet Union which was our enemy, or Pakistan, so Pakistan was the logical choice for mphasis.INTERVIEWER: I was wondering how much you know about Vance, you know different views between Vance and Brzezinski, is that something you could talk about? Different views about the Soviet intentions. I was just wondering what sorts of views are floating around the administration in 78/79 with regard to the Soviets intentions in Afghanistan?DR CHARLES COGAN : There was certainly a diversion of opinion between the hard-liners in the Carter administration particularly Brzezinski who was the National Security Advisor,also Schlesinger who retained some authority hidden in he former Secretary of Defense former CIA director who was then Secretary of Energy. This hard line group favored a crack down in Iran, I think in retrospect some of them still feel that this might have worked. I personally don’t think so because I think the monarchy was terminal, the Shah had no will. Vance and the shall we say the State Department in general I think looked towards the possibility of a smooth transition whereby the monarchy would cede some power to the dissidents who were considered to be not just Khomeini but moderates around him and there were some and this could be a successful transition to a parliamentary a constitutional monarchy, which turned out to be not the case, the country was engulfed by the Khomeini revolution. So when it came to Afghanistan and the following year, or in the same year, 79, I don’t think that there was much opposition or difference ithin the government about doing something concerning Afghanistan and certainly after the oviet invasion in December 1979, there was very little quarrel with undertaking a cover action in Afghanistan in contrast to the great dispute which went on for months over Iran. The hard-liners had their representative the Yukon commander General Heiser and communicating directly it was a really a bifurcated US policy that ended very badly in Iran.INTERVIEWER: Right, could you talk us through the reason behind Brzezinski’s visit to Pakistan and what the US was hoping to get from the Pakistanis at that stage? DR CHARLES COGAN: When was this visit?INTERVIEWER: It was just after the invasion I think Brzezinski then had his first visit to pakistan by Brzezinski.DR CHARLES COGAN: Well,INTERVIEWER: Around the first time the CIA made contact, because it was thought of as the first period to set up possible conduit of aid DR CHARLES COGAN : Well the CIA as I mentioned a moment ago had already set up a conduit of contacts from approximately July 1979 onwards. So this allowed for the reaction to be very swift. A presidential finding was signed I think on something like 30 December and the first arms when it arrived in Pakistan on the 10th of anuary, so this was an extremely swift reaction, because the conduit was already there and the visit of Brzezinski was certainly to reinforce the political level the new elationship, the reinforced relationship between the US and Pakistan.INTERVIEWER: Why do you think Zia turned down the 400 million-dollar offer of Aid?DR CHARLES COGAN: Zia in the early years of the war was quite concerned about the possible Soviet reaction against Pakistan. He had this metaphor that he used to use with Casey, that we have to keep the pot boiling but we can’t let it boil over, we can’t let it go too far. And I think he was anchored in this opinion and I think mostly people in Washington were too, until it became, until two things became apparent. Firstly that very considerable losses were ingnflicted on the Russians, secondly the Russians had begun to alter their tactics in 84/85 and were inflicting considerable damage on the Mujaheddin and at that point people began thinking of new weapons. Not just weapons that could be explained away quote unquote as having come from the battle field, but weapons that would be effective against helicopter tactics of the Soviets and this led to the stinger, and the stingers came on stream operationally in September 86 in attack at “Jallalabah”. But Zia until very late in the game was very cautious about possible Soviet moves there had been assassinations in the camps, there had been occasional Soviet air raids and I think he was concerned that Pakistan might have to pay a very heavy price so he didn’t want to go too far.INTERVIEWER: I mean what sort of different views were there in the Reagan administration about US policy in Afghanistan and the possible drawbacks of backing fundamentalist groups like the Mujaheddin?DR CHARLES COGAN: The question of the US aid to fundamentalist groups has really become a well partially distorted first as a general comment I would say that not only the US but many of the regimes in the Middle East fought during the cold war in the 70 particularly that the fundamentalists or the Islamists could be used as a counterweight to the communists. So there was some thread of that, but the postmortem on the Afghan war which holds that the US gave all its aid to the fundamentalists, is simply wrong. The US tried to distribute arms fairly to the groups who were doing most of the fighting and the groups who were doing most of the fighting were the “Hapmajar” group which was fundamentalist and the “Masoud” group which was not, moderate fundamentalists shall we say. So we always tried to set a proportion with the Pakistanis. Now they were in charge and we could only do so much, we knew they didn’t, they were not particularly fond of Masoud, but we tried to hold them to this. We tried to monitor the deliveries. So I think it is an exaggeration to say the least that the US supported the fundamentalists consciously during the Afghan war. The people who complain most against the US support of the fundamentalists were these various monarchical, or pro-monarchical groups who were not doing much of the fighting. And vibration speaker mainly in the “Pushton” areas.INTERVIEWER: But dn’Pakistan really have an Agenda of their own with regard to which groups they wanted to favor?DR CHARLES COGAN : Certainlythey had an Agenda of their own, we knew that the then chief f the Pakistani service, general Aktar, used to chide us as we’d haggle over these things and he’d say your friend Massoud. We knew that he wasn’t terribly enamoured of this Tajic, ho is not a “Poshtoon” but I think he dealt with us reasonably fairly and let me also say this, that the Pak service is probably the best organization in Pakistan in terms of arrying things out.INTERVIEWER: But looking back doesn’t it seem rather odd that the US were dealing with leaders like “Ekmatier” who was one of the most sort of radical Islamic nti-American leaders around?DR CHARLES COGAN : On the question of “Hekmatie”, the US of course didn’t deal with him, the Paks were the ones who dealt with “Hekmatie”. Our concern as in many other situations in the cold war, was who could carry the fight to the Russians? And Hekmatie at the iphone speaker time was certainly along with Masoud, the two most prominent commanders who were producing results against the Russians. So we had a very if you will, cold-blooded view of things. Our interest was in reversing the tables on the Russians, after Vietnam.INTERVIEWER: I mean some Mujaheddin leaders have sort of said to us that they really feel that it was the unfair distribution of aid by Pakistan that really just added to the divisions in the Mujaheddin and really, really hindered them when it ipod speaker came to you know people like Masoud trying to make a cohesive fighting force, that really Pakistan was just out for their own, just to back a sort of more fundamentalist group really. I mean they said, they claim that they got a lot less aid, that some aid was cut off, how do you answer that?DR CHARLES COGAN : As I say, I think we had a good experience dealing with the ISID, the Pak service. That doesn’t mean that they didn’t do some things behind our back that’s quite possible, but I think that the people we dealt with, General Aktar and after he was killed, Hamid “Goole” were pretty straight. And I would say this, that the, percentages that were worked out with the Pakistanis I think the figures were something ike 18% for each for “Hekmatie” and Masoud working down the “Nabi” group I think was bout 10% and the Galani group, Mujadedde, they were about 5%. It worked out on a percentage basis, that was the rule of thumb we used and we tried to carry it out as best ujaheddin movement or create dissension within it. Our aim was to carry the fight to the oviets.INTERVIEWER: I mean how significant were the Senate pressure groups led by people ike Charlie Wilson and Gordon Humphries in changing US policy towards Afghanistan?DR CHARLES COGAN; Well in the US Congress there were people who had the which I think was off base that you could move in arms unilaterally into Afghanistan, airdrop them, this is just unrealistic. certain people such as Charlie Wilson, thought that we should disregard this notion of a phrase that is used in the CIA plausible denial and use weapons that couldn’t credibly be explained as having come off the battle field and he was particularly interested in an anti-aircraft gun which was a rather expensive piece of weaponry called the Orlakan gun. And some were introduced into Afghanistan but they were not decisive, he did push the stinger too and others in Congress did and I think that the Stinger was very decisive.INTERVIEWER: Do you think really that they were responsible for escalating the conflict and hardening attitudes against the UN settlement?DR HARLES COGAN : I don’t think that the US escalation of the conflict hindered the UN settlement Russians do understand force and fortunately 86 I think it was Gorbachev came in and he was more conciliatory certainly than his predecessors and this led to the breaking of the impasse. Escalation of the war, arrival of Gorbachev on the scene. It appears to me that basically the trouble with as Gorbachev always said the trouble with the Reagan administration was actually trying to convince them that he was serious. It appears to me that Gorbachev was just not believed as being able, being serious in his offer of withdrawal.DR CHARLES COGAN: I think that was true at the beginning it was Gorbachev was not taken seriously in his offers of withdrawal, nor was he taken seriously in his offers of disarmament, but gradually it became apparent that Gorbachev was somebody who could deal with certain people in the government were slow in coming around this view, but I think by the time of the Reykjavik summit it was clear that we had something going here and Gorbachev was certainly the key figure in ending the Cold war if he were not around at the time I don’t think the Cold Warwould have ended as gracefully as it did.INTERVIEWER: Do you think that America’s Vietnam experience in any way influenced US policy towards Afghanistan?DR CHARLES COGAN : I think merica’s failure in Vietnam certainly was a powerful impulsion to carry a fight to the Soviets by means of a proxy war, and when it all came out in the end they lost about a quarter of what we lost in Vietnam. I think it was something like 58,000 US dead in ietnam and 14,000 Soviet dead in Afghanistan. So in a sense it was, it was a payback. Or we viewed it that way.INTERVIEWER: Do you think that influenced policy towards Afghanistan?DR CHARLES COGAN: Well the question of a come back after Vietnam only gradually took hold but by the time of the arrival of the Reagan administration and the evil empire speech it was clear that a great head of steam had been built up in the US over the failures of American policy in Vietnam and the disastrous war that we somehow got ourselves mired into and there was a great impulsion to turn the tables and get back our osition of pre-eminence over the Russians which we had enjoyed for most of the Cold war until the late 70s.INTERVIEWER: Right. I mean before the invasion of Afghanistan the US had consistently criticized Pakistan over its development of the nuclear deterrent and yet it was willing to give them an easy ride when it came to acting as a conduit for military aid to the Mujaheddin, why?DR CHARLES COGAN: The question of the US letting up the pressure on the Pak nuclear program during the Afghan war although in official policy statements I’m sure this would not be emphasized, nevertheless I think it was, it was a matter of convenience and there was a certain degree of truth in it.INTERVIEWER: I mean do you actually think that the US stance actually helped Pakistan achieve the goal?
DR CHARLES COGAN: Pakistan did advance to some degree in the development of nuclear weapons in the 70s and 80s, since the end of the Afghan war, perhaps you could say isingenuously the US has become more vigilant on the question of Pak nuclear capability and I think the US is keeping a very close eye on the possibility of nuclear confrontation in the sub-continent. There was the Gates mission in may/June of 1990 which helped to dampen down the possibility which seemed to be at least remotely there at the time that there might be a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India.INTERVIEWER: I was just wondering could I ask you something about that, I mean when Gorbachev came in you know here was an announcement that he was gonna withdraw, I mean how did the elements of the administration react then? Did they think he was serious?DR CHARLES COGAN : I think there as initial skepticism about Gorbachev’s offer to withdraw, but I think as time went on and of course there were many other facets to the American Soviet relationship, there was the disarmament question, other questions, it became apparent, that there was this elationship between Baker and Shevernadze, it became apparent that these were people we could deal with. In contrast to this previous period of Brezhnevism and Post Brezhnevism which was not a compromising period at all.INTERVIEWER: Gorbachev has said in the past that really it was, really the biggest problems of withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan was trying to convince Reagan and his administration that he was serious, I mean in a way one could say there was a lot of lost opportunities there because no one wanted to take him seriously.DR CHARLES COGAN : I’m skeptical that the US would have done better in agreeing to an early withdrawal of the Soviets in Afghanistan. I think that the question is really, whether the So, whether the US should have continued its aid to the Mujaheddin, after the Soviet withdrawal. Whether this was really useful or not, because the main object in this program was to damage the Soviets and to get them, damage them in Afghanistan and eventually to drive them out of Afghanistan and to inflict on them a tremendous psychological defeat in the cold war. And once having done that when the last Soviet came out of Afghanistan I think there is some question there as to whether we should have continued our support of the Mujaheddin.BRIEF CHATINTERVIEWER:: I’m just wondering, talking about the Geneva I think this whole thing is quite interesting with the arrival of Gorbachev and this instant withdrawal. I mean there seems to be a sort of policy differences then between the State Department and the Pentagon about how they should proceed, I mean the story in 85 when, with you know the Whitehead speech, you know agreeing to the guarantees of the Geneva accords, and he is quoted as saying he had to make 95% of his speech anti Soviet to please who he called the Evil Empire people he was referring to the hard liners there. I mean there seems to be a major, there seems to have been a major reluctance to follow up the Geneva Accords and a possible peaceful ettlement.DR CHARLES COGAN: Well I think there was a great deal of skepticism about Soviet intentions on the part of the Reagan White House. It’s paradoxical there certainly were ivisions of opinion over whether there should be a negotiated solution or not but there was never any great dissension within the administration on the question of, continuing to put pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan with the provision of weapons there was a this as a problem free program from that point of view, it was not at all like other covert action programs such as in Central America where there was real political difference. There was no political difference to speak of in terms of keeping the pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan, there certainly were nuances as to whether negotiations should be given more favorable attention or not, but the pressure, there was no problem, there was no opposition really. The opposition really came from people who wanted us to do more. Such as people in the Congress.INTERVIEWER: The intelligence suggests in the mid 80s, was CIA intelligence suggesting that the Russian military were calling for an escalation in Afghanistan and did they tell Gorbachev that they wanted, we were given the impression they were saying “Give us two years to prove we can win it” and then, have you heard of hat?DR CHARLES COGAN : There were indications certainly in the mid 80s that the Soviets had adopted or were in the process of adopting they had brought a new general in there, a ew tactic of using helicopter gun ships in an attempt to finish off the war. So yes this was very much in our minds, I think particularly in terms of the decision to finally goand use the Stingers.INTERVIEWER: I was just wondering in a way, how that influenced your attitudes to Gorbachev and his offers of withdrawal if you actually knew, you’d explained, knowing what you knew behind the scenes of your contact with the Russian military. And in ct was Gorbachev just making these inroads to withdraw, was he actually agreeing to a military escalation over two years to win the war?DR CHARLES COGAN : Well I think the time sequence is such that Gorbachev I believe came in, in 85 but he really didn’t get his policy organized until 86, and by that time this Soviet program had already been launched and we had put the Stingers in as I said the first Stinger attack was in September of 86, so I think it , I don’t think you can inpoint that Khrushchev, excuse me Gorbachev was carrying on two policies at once. Now he might have been unaware of exactly what his military was doing in Afghanistan, but I don’t think that he was on a two-trpolicy of winning the war on the one hand and negotiating a settlement on the other. It doesn’t sound like Gorbachev to me.INTERVIEWER: I was just wondering, I mean what was wrong really with UN attempts to negotiate a peaceful end to the war, with regard to military aid, an end to military aid, a coalitiongovernment in Kabul and a role for the king, I mean why was there a reluctance on the part of the US to sign to that agreement?DR CHARLES COGAN : I think as I mentioned a moment ago the, there was always a residual suspicion in the US, even stronger to day toward the UN and what the UN can do. And that coupled with the lack of trust in the US towards the whole Brezhnev period, the so-called second cold war of the 70s, and early 80s did not inspire confidence in Washington. And we had a presidency that was very hard line vis a vis the Soviets. If this had been a different period than the Brezhnev and post Brezhnev periods in Russia. If it had been a different president in the US things might have come out a little bit differently, but there was a, there was quite a fierce confrontation, at least verbally between Washington and Moscow in those years.INTERVIEWER: I mean do you not think then that it’s a given that the superpowers should really take some sort of responsibility for the continued unrest in Afghanistan after that period?DR CHARLES COGAN : Certainly the people who supplied weapons to Afghanistan are responsible if you will for the continuing fighting there. But all I n say is you have to look back and say we won the cold war. So people tend to forget that this was a very, although nothing happened this was a very dangerous confrontation and some terrible things could have happened during the Cold War. It ended peacefully, maybe we take it too much for granted.INTERVIEWER: I mean what do you think ultimately was really responsible for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan?DR CHARLES COGAN : I think the Soviets finally decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, because they saw, they couldn’t win the war. They had a very nsiderable commitment which they did not want to increase. hey had 105,000 troops there. So I think they came to the cold calculation around 1986 that if they didn’t have the resources or the will to escalate up to 350,000 or more the prudent thing for them to do was to pull out. Perhaps the US should have done that in Vietnam, but they came to the cold calculation and I think that there has been some coverage of this by Steve Cole in the Washington Post which I’ve quoted in one of my articles. But they had a meeting, Shevernadze was in on it and they decided that this is, the mathematics of it were not there, they couldn’t win with the commitment of 105,000 troops. They didn’t, they couldn’t escalate, didn’t have the resources or the will, so they decided to pull out.INTERVIEWER: But how significant do you think Afghanistan was in the ending the cold war?DR CHARLES COGAN: I think Afghanistan was extremely significant in ending the cold war because it was the high watermark of Soviet involvement outside the Soviet block. It failed, they pulled back, there was there were heavy casualties it got through to the Soviet public. There was a great expenditure of resources and it presaged the Soviet collapse. That’s not the, people say, that it would have happened anyway, perhaps that’s true, but I think that without Afghanistan, without Gorbachev it could have persisted to the year 2000.INTERVIEWER: I mean looking back over the 10 years, the war in Afghanistan, all the death, destruction, suffering and the fact that really the conflict is still going on, how does it make you feel?DR CHARLES COGAN: I believe that American national interest is, is the primary object of our foreign policy. We got into this cold war with the Soviets, perhaps it was 10% our fault, probably 90% their fault. This went on or 50 years. And it was a struggle that if not to say we won, they lost. Now they’ve been obviously there has been a great deal of suffering, a great deal of fall out. But in the larger strategic sense, and you have to look at it this way if you’re dealing with American Foreign Policy, it was a victory for the US and for the West. And I don’t frankly have any great regrets over this. As I say, the only thing I question is whether we should have continued on this if you will, this momentum, this inertia if aiding the Mujaheddin, fter the Soviets had left. I think that was, probably in retrospect it was a mistake, ecause basically, especially now that the Soviet system has collapsed, we don’t care who is in power in these places. It is not important to us anymore, it shouldn’t be.INTERVIEWER: That is an interesting point really that perhaps we should ask more questions bout. Can we ask you just one more question about that?I was wondering with the Accords,I mean along the lines of what you have just been saying, why was there, this and you can express your own feelings about this again if you like, forget that you have just said that, why was there this reluctance to sign the accords and finish the aid, finish military aid. Why did the US and Russia for that matter want to continue this pouring in f military aid, after the Geneva Accords?DR CHARLES COGAN : I think the US was reluctant to sign on to a complete cessation of aid, because they were at a distinct disadvantage, the “najbullah” government was getting far more in terms of assistance than we were providing to the Mujaheddin, and I thought that, I think that people consider at that time that the whole game might be lost, that the Soviets might have installed a puppet regime without their forces there and the effort would have gone to not. What we didn’t anticipate was the collapse of the Soviet Union 89 to 91. If we had known that certainly we wouldn’t have, we would not have continued our assistance.INTERVIEWER: We’ve got a section where we talk about the Mujaheddin about a fighting force, or not as a fighting force as the case may be. I just wondered how effective, how effective a fighting force you think the Mujaheddin were?DR CHARLES COGAN : The Afghans of course have a history of being very doughty fighters and I think wedamn good. They’re good with weapons, they can endure great hardships, they can take casualties and not worry too much about it. It’s in their, it’s in their blood, it’s almost like the ghurkas in a way.INTERVIEWER: What about the you know the negative aspects of that, you know of the Mujaheddin as a fighting force?  dR CHARLES COGAN : Well of course there was a great deal of disorganization, mass attacks, not coordinated tactics, I think that the training that went on in Pakistan and Afghanistan run by the inner services intelligence directorate, was very effective, and this was on a large scale. And there ere certain US Special Forces advisors, advising also in the camps in Pakistan, limited numbers.INTERVIEWER: What about the infighting between the Mujaheddin groups, I mean some eople have said you know they almost spend as much time fighting themselves as they did, especially groups like “Hizbezlami and ….” than actually fighting the Russians.DR CHARLES COGAN: Well I think we can see in the aftermath that Afghans find it very difficult to agree among themselves. And there was a predisposition for a rivalry, that is unrivalled. This is a very hard country to achieve unity and perhaps it never will. It certainly will not be a centralized country, controlled from the Center. It never has been. It is possible it might split along North South lines, anything is possible.CHATDR CHARLES COGAN: I think there was a very strong rivalry between the various groups. This was evident toward the end of the war, when they were fighting to get to Kabul first, and we see in the aftermath that it’s very difficult for these groups to come together and to coalesce and I think that its this is true of Afghanistan as a country fday one, it’s a cross roads country. It has two main divisions, north and south, Pushtoons in the South and the others in the North and it’s possible that the country might eventually split long north south lines. We’ve seen the tremendous difficulty that the Taliban had to impose itself on the north, they were immediately thrown back and now they’re back at Kabul.INTERVIEWER: Yes ‘s something do you remember the very first CIA meeting with Hekmatie?DR CHARLES COGAN: Was this before the war?INTERVIEWER: Yes 79, a CIA official was introduced to Hekmatie.CHAT ABOUT WHERE AND WHENDR CHARLES COGAN: Well its possible I wouldn’t at all discount you know that at one time or another an Embassy officer or a CIA fficer ran across Hekmatie at a political meeting or something and met with them, but it was an official contact brokered through the ISID, I find that surprising.